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Introduction
his article investigates two particular aspects as to how the terrorist threat in the UK has 
been characterised, arguing that they both challenge conventional academic wisdom as to 
how terrorism should be conceptualised. While such conventional wisdom should always be 
open to challenge, and policymaking perspectives are different to those of academics, these two 
particular aspects as to how the terrorist threat has been perceived in the UK merit scrutiny, 
especially as counter-terrorism strategies have been premised on them. They are: i) the 
contemporary and explicit concern with ‘extremist’ but non-violent ideas that are said to be 
‘conducive’ to terrorism as a focus for a counter-terrorism response and ii) the notion that terrorism 
has increasingly been seen as the product of ‘vulnerability’. The first, and the main focus of this 
article, appears to challenge the widely held view within terrorism studies that, when defining 
terrorism, reference to the cause or the perpetrator is unhelpful because terrorism should first and 
foremost (and more objectively) be seen as a particular method of violence that has been used by a 
wide variety of actors, regardless of the ideology or the belief systems of its perpetrators. The 
second aspect – the impetus towards viewing terrorism as the product of vulnerability or individual 
fallibility - arguably implies a diminished capacity for rational behaviour, which challenges a 
further commonly held view within terrorism studies: that terrorism entails the use of calculated and 
rational acts of violence.
The 2011 versions of Contest and Prevent
In June 2011 the British government’s updated Prevent strategy was published and was followed a 
month later by the third version of its Contest strategy. Arguably, the most interesting and 
controversial theme running through the two documents is the increasing emphasis on ideology as a 
focus for a counter-terrorism response. In particular, counter-terrorism in the UK now appears to be 
concerned with ‘extremist (and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology’ and that 
are ‘conducive’ to terrorism. In the context of a burgeoning policy interest with the concept of 
‘radicalisation’ in recent years and its rather indeterminate scope (when it hadn’t always been clear 
as to what precisely the remit of counter-terrorism had been), these new documents in 2011 
represented something of a step change in that they more explicitly focus on ideology, and even 
non-violent ideology, as an important part of the remit of counter-terrorism.
Early in the Contest document it states that ‘Greater effort will be focused on responding to the 
ideological challenge and the threat from those who promote it’[1] and goes on to argue that:
T
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‘We	  believe	  that	  Prevent	  work	  to	  date	  has	  not	  clearly	  recognised	  the	  way	  in	  which	  some	  
terrorist	  ideologies	  draw	  on	  and	  make	  use	  of	  extremist	  ideas	  which	  are	  espoused	  and	  
circulated	  by	  apparently	  non-­‐violent	  organisations,	  very	  often	  operating	  within	  the	  law…	  
preventing	  radicalisation	  must	  mean	  challenging	  extremist	  ideas	  that	  are	  conducive	  to	  
terrorism	  and	  also	  part	  of	  a	  terrorist	  narrative.’	  [2]
The document makes it clear that radical action is required against those who are not just terrorists 
but who may have non-violent but ‘extremist’ views. Extremism is defined in the Prevent document 
as ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, 
individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.’[3] A clear 
distinction is made between terrorism and (non-violent) extremism but both are now, it seems, to be 
the focus of a counter-terrorism strategy: ‘where people seek to enter this country from overseas to 
engage in activity in support of extremist as well as terrorist groups we will also use the Home 
Secretary’s powers to exclude them.’[4] The document justifies this strategy by arguing that:
‘The	  focus	  of	  Prevent	  to	  date	  has	  been	  on	  violent	  extremism	  and	  terrorism.	  It	  has	  not	  
explicitly	  considered	  non	  violent	  extremism.	  However	  a	  signiGicant	  percentage	  of	  people	  
who	  engage	  in	  terrorism	  have	  previously	  been	  associated	  with	  extremist	  groups;	  some	  
terrorist	  organisations	  –	  of	  all	  kinds	  –	  also	  share	  and	  make	  use	  of	  ideas	  which	  are	  
popularised	  by	  extremists.	  In	  some	  cases	  extremist	  groups	  carefully	  operate	  within	  our	  
laws,	  deliberately	  avoiding	  open	  support	  for	  violence	  but	  knowingly	  creating	  an	  
environment	  in	  which	  people	  can	  be	  drawn	  into	  terrorism	  itself.	  We	  believe	  that	  Prevent	  
work	  therefore	  necessarily	  has	  to	  deal	  with	  some	  aspects	  of	  extremism	  and	  this	  is	  clearly	  
reGlected	  in	  our	  new	  strategy.	  We	  emphasise	  here	  that	  we	  have	  no	  intention	  of	  labelling	  
particular	  faith	  groups	  (and	  orthodox	  faith	  in	  particular)	  as	  inherently	  extremist.	  That	  is	  
neither	  our	  view	  nor	  our	  purpose.’	  [5]
The revised Prevent document at the outset announces the intention to ‘respond to the ideological 
challenge of terrorism and the threat from those who promote it. In doing so, we must be clear: the 
ideology of extremism and terrorism is the problem; legitimate religious belief emphatically is not’, 
before going on to state that ‘preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-
violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology.’[6] It is the notion of tackling ‘non-violent’ 
ideology as part of a counter-terrorism response that seems to be most controversial about the new 
strategy. It is justified on the grounds that:
‘Some	  politically	  extreme	  organisations	  routinely	  claim	  that:	  the	  West	  is	  perpetually	  at	  
war	  with	  Islam;	  there	  can	  be	  no	  legitimate	  interaction	  between	  Muslims	  and	  non-­‐Muslims	  
in	  this	  country	  or	  elsewhere;	  and	  that	  Muslims	  living	  here	  cannot	  legitimately	  and	  or	  
effectively	  participate	  in	  our	  democratic	  society.	  Islamist	  extremists	  can	  speciGically	  attack	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the	  principles	  of	  participation	  and	  cohesion,	  rejection	  of	  which	  we	  judge	  to	  be	  associated	  
with	  an	  increased	  willingness	  to	  use	  violence	  …	  Islamist	  extremists	  can	  purport	  to	  identify	  
problems	  to	  which	  terrorist	  organisations	  then	  claim	  to	  have	  a	  solution.’	  [7]
Prevent will, therefore, ‘mean intervening to try to stop people moving from extremist groups or 
extremism into terrorist-related activity.’[8] It is this potential conduit between non-violent 
extremism and terrorism that the government is seeking to address:
‘Some	  people	  who	  become	  members	  of	  terrorist	  groups	  have	  previously	  been	  members	  of	  
extremist	  organisations	  and	  have	  been	  radicalised	  by	  them.	  Others	  (though	  not	  all)	  pass	  
through	  an	  extremist	  phase	  …	  Preventing	  people	  becoming	  terrorists	  will	  require	  a	  
challenge	  to	  extremist	  ideas	  where	  they	  are	  used	  to	  legitimise	  terrorism	  and	  are	  shared	  by	  
terrorist	  groups.	  It	  will	  also	  require	  intervention	  to	  stop	  people	  beginning	  to	  move	  away	  
from	  extremist	  but	  legal	  groups	  into	  proscribed	  illegal	  terrorist	  organisations.’	  [9]
The context of ‘radicalisation’ as a focus of C-T
The increasing emphasis on non-violent ideology has taken place in the context of a burgeoning 
policy interest in the phenomenon of ‘radicalisation’ in the past seven or eight years. This wider 
concern with radicalisation as a focus of the UK’s counter-terrorism response facilitated the 
expansion of the remit of c-t beyond countering terrorism and into other policy areas such as those 
to do with societal cohesion and integration, although the latest Prevent strategy distances itself 
from the integration agenda. Yet, because there has been little consensus as to what is meant by 
radicalisation, or who the ‘radicalised’ refers to, the remit of counter-terrorism or ‘counter-
radicalisation’ also lacked clarity - evident in a ‘Prevent’ strand of Contest that, prior to 2011, 
‘confusingly oscillated between tackling violent extremism in particular to promoting community 
cohesion and ‘shared values’ more broadly’.[10]
Despite the then broader ‘societal’ and ideological objectives to do with shared values within c-t 
strategy, the 2009 version of Contest restricted its definition of radicalisation to: ‘the process by 
which people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups’.[11] This 
definition inextricably links radicalisation to violence rather than to any non-violent goals. It is 
perhaps even more surprising, then, given its more explicit focus on non-violent ideology and (non-
violent) ‘extremism’, that the latest version of Contest also confines its definition of radicalisation 
to ‘the process by which people come to support, and in some cases to participate in terrorism’.[12] 
This doesn’t appear to tally with the implied (non-violent) meaning of radicalisation in the same 
document when it proposed that ‘preventing radicalisation must mean challenging extremist ideas’. 
[13]
It seems reasonable to suggest, however, that, notwithstanding these narrow definitions, there are in 
fact both violent and non-violent forms of radicalisation. Demos concurred that ‘the last decade in 
particular has also seen a growth in many types of what it called non-violent radicalisation’ [italics 
added] and argued that ‘a successful counter-terrorism strategy must be based on a clear 
understanding of these distinct forms of radicalisation’.[14] It also seems clear that the concern with 
radicalisation as a focus for a counter-terrorism response has expanded the remit of counter-
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terrorism to tackling (non democratic) ideas as well as terrorism, and this has now been made more 
explicit in the updated versions of Contest and Prevent in 2011.
Terrorism as a particular method of violence
The characterisation of the terrorist threat in the UK as being something inherently linked to certain 
non-violent ideologies challenges conventional wisdom within terrorism studies on how terrorism is 
conceptualised - that it is best understood as a particular method of violence and definitions that 
make reference to the perpetrator or to the particular cause (beyond being political) are unhelpful. 
As Leonard Weinberg so rightly observed the notion of ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter’ is confusing the goal with the activity.[15] So too, therefore, does the view 
(apparently articulated by the UN Secretary-General in March 1987 in relation to the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization and the South West Africa People’s Organization) that ‘sometimes it is 
difficult to tell where terrorism ends and the struggle for self-determination begins.’[16] It is also 
why many observers miss the point when they pose such questions as: ‘where to draw the line 
between the quest for nationalist identity and an act of terrorism …?’[17] or when Yasir Arafat 
declared that:
‘The	  difference	  between	  the	  revolutionary	  and	  the	  terrorist	  lies	  in	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  
each	  Gights.	  For	  whoever	  stands	  by	  a	  just	  cause	  and	  Gights	  for	  the	  freedom	  and	  liberation	  of	  
his	  land	  from	  the	  invaders,	  the	  settlers	  and	  the	  colonialists,	  cannot	  possibly	  be	  called	  a	  
terrorist	  ….’.[18]
The difference between the terrorist and the non terrorist does not lie in the reason for which one 
fights, as Arafat proclaimed. Otherwise we are conceding that terrorism really is ‘violence that we 
don’t like’ (or whose cause we disagree with) and that there is in fact nothing qualitatively 
distinctive about terrorism compared with other forms of political violence. When faced with 
terrorist attacks, such as those of 9/11, 7/7, or Madrid, this is presumably a position that 
policymakers do not countenance.
Terrorism is a distinctive phenomenon that is not inherent to any particular non violent ideology. It 
has been used as a method in pursuit of a wide range of ideologies most of which are not inherently 
violent. There are, however, some ideologies where the use of violence is integral to the ideology 
itself –such as fascism, as in the cases of Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. This particular 
ideology has underpinned some of the most brutal campaigns of ‘state terror’. The violence that 
may be integral to the ideology, however, is not necessarily terrorist violence. For example, in the 
context of sub-state neo-fascist groups, terrorism may be the particular method of violence used as 
the means to an end, even if that end entails the continued use of violence through other forms such 
as more widespread ‘state terror’ or ‘political terror’ as distinct from terrorism. In other words even 
general ideologies of violence are not inherently ‘terrorist’, though they may be more ‘conducive’ to 
terrorism.
There may also be ideologies that have been interpreted, adapted or distorted to explicitly justify the 
use of terrorism and where terrorism may then become ideologically embedded. In this sense one 
might indeed call them ‘terrorist ideologies’ where the use of terrorism is intrinsic to the doctrine. It 
could be argued that this is the case with Al Qaeda and the notion of terrorism and political violence 
as a religious duty, or indeed with the tradition of ‘physical force’ Irish republicanism – for example 
Patrick Pearse’s proclamations of the notion of self-sacrificial acts as being a compelling symbol of 
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republican ideology - or left wing dogmas that aim to rouse the consciousness of the proletariat 
through the violent acts of the self-appointed vanguards of the anticipated communist revolution. 
But there are, of course, many nationalist, religious, left wing, right wing, and single issue (anti-
abortion, animal rights, environmental) ideologies that are not inherently violent though terrorism 
has often been employed in their name. Terrorism is not something intrinsic to any particular non 
violent ideology but is a method of violence that has at some time or other been perpetrated in the 
cause of doctrines within all of these categories.
While one concedes that violence is intrinsic to some ideologies, and that, further, terrorist violence 
itself may be embedded in some doctrines, and that therefore one could indeed argue that some 
ideologies may be more ‘conducive’ to terrorism than others, the idea of a non-violent ideology as 
being conducive to terrorism, and therefore of concern to counter-terrorism, is more difficult to 
grasp. To reiterate, ‘terrorism is a method of combat’[19] or as Martha Crenshaw, a respected 
scholar in the field, put it: ‘The method, not the identity or ideology of the user, determines whether 
or not an action can be defined as terrorism.’[20]
Terrorism has been used by a wide range of actors (states, guerrilla groups, terrorist organisations 
etc.) in pursuit of an even wider range of ideologies (both violent and non-violent) and, when 
theorising terrorism, is therefore best seen as a particular method rather than inherent to any 
particular actor or ideology (and certainly not to any non-violent ideology). As offensive as we may 
find some ideologies, labelling particular non-violent causes or doctrines as conducive to terrorism, 
seems to be deflecting us away from the essence of terrorism as a method and, in doing so, to be 
broadening the remit of counter-terrorism beyond it. Pillar perceptively argues that terrorism is 
something that ‘people (or groups, or states) do, rather than who they are or what they are trying to 
achieve’ (author’s italics).[21] Terrorism, as a method, should be ‘defined by the nature of the act, 
not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause.’[22]
Returning to the Contest and Prevent strategies it is ‘extremist ideology’ that is seen as conducive to 
terrorism and, to reiterate, extremism is defined as:
‘vocal	  or	  active	  opposition	  to	  fundamental	  British	  values,	  including	  democracy,	  the	  rule	  of	  
law,	  individual	  liberty	  and	  mutual	  respect	  and	  tolerance	  of	  different	  faiths	  and	  beliefs.’
We can then perhaps infer from this that any undemocratic ideology or any ideology that 
contravenes British values can potentially be a part of a ‘terrorist ideology’, even if it is non-violent. 
To what extent, therefore, for example, are communist parties in democratic societies culpable for 
the activities of terrorist organisations who have the same ideological outlook but who use different 
methods? And on contemporary radical but non-violent views, Demos makes the critical point that 
‘Assuming that radical views constitute the base of the terrorist pyramid can allow for counter-
radicalisation strategies against large numbers of people who object entirely to al Qaeda’s 
methods’ (italics added). [23]
The new version of Contest has set out to ensure that ‘there is more effective challenge to those 
extremists whose views are shared by terrorist organisations and used by terrorists to legitimise 
violence’.[24] This would, of course, have been treated with consternation during the ‘Troubles’ of 
Northern Ireland if this was applied to the non-violent Social Democratic and Labour Party who 
shared a similar (nationalist) ideology with the Irish Republican Army, or indeed to the unionist 
parties because they shared an opposing nationalist ideology with loyalist terrorist organisations. 
The difference is that the British government had no particular aversion to either of these nationalist  
ideologies but they did object to the methods used by the IRA and the loyalist terrorist 
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organisations. In the face of the contemporary threat the British government is concerned with 
ideology, aswell as the methods used to pursue it. It is, however, debateable as the extent to which 
non-violent and legal ideological challenges to British democracy should be the concern of a 
counter-terrorism strategy in addition to any (terrorist) methods used to support them.
What, then, are the implications of characterising the terrorist threat in this way for counter-
terrorism? The first logical outcome is that ‘intervention providers’ tasked with preventing 
individuals becoming terrorists are not permitted to share the same ideological outlook as them: 
‘intervention providers must not have extremist beliefs’ and yet ‘they must have credibility’ and be 
‘able to reach and relate to’ them.[25] While there is no evidence on this available to the author it 
does prompt the question as to how effective ‘non-extremist’ interveners are in comparison to 
‘extremist’ ones, and to what extent, if at all, this exclusion of non-violent extremist interveners 
helps or hinders what should surely be the primary goal of counter-terrorism – preventing acts of 
terrorism.
While it is important to acknowledge the government’s concern that a ‘significant percentage of 
people who engage in terrorism have previously been associated with [non-violent] extremist 
groups’, one has to question whether any non-violent ideology itself can be culpable for this, rather 
than those who would urge the adoption of terrorist methods to achieve it, or who would 
‘knowingly … [create] … an environment’ that endorses the use of terrorism.[26] Moreover, the 
concern with non violent ideology as a focus of a counter-terrorism strategy diminishes the prospect 
of opening up radical but non-violent avenues for democratic political expression as an alternative 
to the use of terrorism. Writing on the clear distinction between ‘disengagement’ and 
‘deradicalisation’, Horgan’s empirical research found that:
‘the	  disengaged	  terrorist	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  …	  ‘deradicalized’	  at	  all	  …	  In	  fact,	  in	  the	  
sample	  of	  former	  terrorists	  I	  interviewed	  from	  2006	  to	  2008,	  while	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  
interviewees	  could	  be	  described	  as	  disengaged,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  them	  could	  not	  be	  said	  
to	  be	  ‘deradicalized.’[27]
Thus, what in counter-terrorism and security terms could be seen as a success would in 
deradicalisation (or counter-radicalisation) terms be seen as an abject failure. Yet, in preventing 
terrorism it is surely the former that we should be concerned with, and one has to question the 
extent to which any simultaneous focus on non-violent ideology as part of counter-terrorism 
negatively impacts on the prospects for disengagement, or in preventing terrorism in the first place, 
if avenues for expressing radical but non-violent views become blocked. Crenshaw, in her research 
on why terrorism might be abandoned, also found that ‘in no case did groups abandon terrorism 
because they changed their ideological orientation or long-term goals[28]’ and, interestingly, that 
‘Terrorism decreases as the potential for radical collective action increases’.[29]
Democracy and British values
It is, of course, important to challenge undemocratic ideologies and to promote British values. But, 
precisely because the United Kingdom is a country steeped in democratic tradition then these 
dissenting ideologies should be debated and dismissed in the public and political arena and not be 
tackled as part of a counter-terrorism strategy. Arguably, the existence and promotion of 
undemocratic doctrines serves the UK with a powerful opportunity to remind its citizens of the 
virtue of its own values and never to be complacent about them. But this should be part of a broader 
 JTR Volume 3, Issue 1 - Summer 2012 22
endeavour to promote democracy within, whoever the domestic adversary – whether they be those 
advocating communism, fascism, or those that call for undemocratic forms of government based on 
a form of religious interpretation. Any self-confident democracy should be able to effectively 
counter those who use their legal and democratic right to voice dissenting ideological views. This 
self-confidence includes trusting the electorate to endorse British democracy at the polls at the 
expense of those who would undermine it.
These ideological challenges that are part and parcel of democratic life should not be the concern of 
counter-terrorism, whether they emanate from a communist party, the British National Party, or 
from those aiming to establish sharia law in the UK. It is a different matter, of course, if terrorism is 
used as the method, whatever the ideological cause might be.
On ‘vulnerability’
Finally, and briefly, another persistent theme in the two strategy documents is the extent to which 
the terrorist threat in the UK is seen as emanating from ‘vulnerable’ people. In the second version of 
Contest the words ‘vulnerable’ and ‘vulnerability’ (to describe those individuals vulnerable to 
‘violent extremism’) were used no less than 32 times. In the latest Contest strategy this figure fell to 
24 but the updated Prevent strategy used the words vulnerable, vulnerability or vulnerabilities in 
this context a total of 75 times!
The author, in a recent article, has questioned why it is that those who aim to commit terrorist acts 
are assumed to be vulnerable – ‘the idea that they have succumbed to (violent) extremist ideologies 
and that they need guidance so that they can be rescued from the manipulation of others (online or 
otherwise), and that they would not carry out such acts of their own volition’.[30] Hence the 
government’s ‘intention to provide early support to those who are being drawn into 
offending’ (italics added).[31] In the latest version of Contest the notion of terrorism as somehow 
being the product of vulnerability or individual fallibility is further embedded through its emphasis 
on the role of ‘Healthcare professionals’ who ‘may meet and treat people who are vulnerable to 
radicalisation’,[32] while the Prevent strategy argues that:
‘there	  are	  clearly	  many	  opportunities	  for	  doctors,	  nurses	  and	  other	  staff	  to	  help	  protect	  
people	  from	  radicalisation.	  The	  key	  challenge	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  healthcare	  workers	  can	  
identify	  the	  signs	  that	  someone	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  radicalisation,	  interpret	  those	  signs	  
correctly	  and	  access	  the	  relevant	  support.’[33]
Yet, the 7/7 bombers, for example, could not be said to be vulnerable. [34] Indeed, in May 2006 the 
Intelligence and Security Committee report into the London terrorist attacks, concluded ‘that the 
threat is as likely to come from those who appear well assimilated into mainstream UK society, with 
jobs and young families, as from those within socially or economically deprived sections of the 
community.’[35] This isn’t to deny the manipulative influence of online preachers, such as the late 
Al Awlaki, on would-be recruits, nor to suggest that there haven’t been cases of vulnerable people 
(however defined) who have posed a serious threat, such as that of Nicky Reilly, who had the 
mental age of a young child and who tried to set off an explosive device in a restaurant in Exeter in 
May 2008. But, as the author has previously argued,[36] these should not be seen as typical or as 
evidence of the general vulnerability of those who perpetrate acts of terrorism. The more credible 
(empirical) research on terrorists suggests that they are in general psychologically no different to the 
rest of us.[37] Yet, while any notion that terrorists are psychologically deranged or that they have 
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certain personality traits has been discredited, the emphasis on health care professionals ‘treating’ 
those vulnerable’ to radicalisation or to committing acts of terrorism seems to be leading us towards 
an adaptation of this thinking.
The impetus towards characterising the terrorist in the UK as largely the outcome of individual 
fallibility or ‘vulnerability’ implies a diminished capacity for rational behaviour which also appears 
to be at variance with conventional wisdom in terrorism studies - that terrorism involves the 
perpetration of rational and calculated acts of violence. As the author has also previously noted:
‘it	  appears	  that	  the	  possibility	  that	  terrorism	  at	  home	  could	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  rational	  act	  
by	  the	  perpetrators	  in	  response	  to	  British	  military	  action	  abroad	  seems	  to	  be	  entirely	  
absent	  from	  governmental	  discourse.[38]	  In	  this	  context	  one	  might	  be	  forgiven	  for	  
thinking,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘vulnerable’	  has	  been	  politically	  motivated	  to	  
imply	  a	  diminished	  capacity	  for	  rational	  behaviour	  -­‐	  to	  facilitate	  the	  notion	  that	  nobody	  in	  
their	  right	  mind	  could	  possibly	  react	  in	  such	  a	  way	  to	  UK	  interventions	  in	  Iraq	  and	  
Afghanistan,	  that	  they	  must	  have	  been	  manipulated	  and	  that	  those	  that	  are	  being	  drawn	  
into	  violent	  extremism	  (and	  are	  therefore	  not	  really	  acting	  of	  their	  own	  rational	  volition)	  
need	  our	  help	  and	  protection	  for	  their	  ‘recuperation’	  into	  mainstream	  society.’	  [39]
The characterisation of vulnerability, like the focus on non-violent ideology, also has implications 
for the remit of counter-terrorism because ‘it lends itself to a broader spectrum of response 
concerned with potentially numerous ‘vulnerable’ individuals’.[40]
Conclusion
This article has argued that two of the ways that the contemporary terrorist threat has been 
characterised challenge conventional wisdom on terrorism. Firstly, the idea of combating ‘non-
violent’ ideology as part of a counter-terrorist strategy deflects us from the predominant academic 
understanding of terrorism as a method rather than being inherent to any particular doctrine, and 
especially to any non-violent one; and secondly, that the increasing emphasis on presenting 
terrorism as the product of vulnerability and personal fallibility, with a concomitantly enhanced role 
for medical health professionals in response, implies a diminished capacity for rational behaviour 
when it has generally been agreed within terrorism studies that terrorism entails the perpetration of 
rational and calculated acts of violence. Policy perspectives are, of course, very different to those of 
academia and it would be absurd if governments were not to scrutinise both the perpetrators and the 
cause in whose name terrorism was carried out. But one has to question whether a non-violent 
ideology itself can be culpable for acts of terrorism. It is surely those who choose to employ the 
method of terrorism that should be of concern, whatever the doctrine or cause might be. Finally, the 
international aspiration of achieving a universally agreed definition of terrorism would be further 
complicated by the notion that certain non-violent ideologies, though non-violent, have some 
intrinsic connection to terrorism.
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